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ARTICLE
Does institutional quality condition the impact of financial stability transparency
on financial stability?
Tim van Duurena, Jakob de Haana,b,c and Henk van Kerkhoffb
aUniversity of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands; bDe Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; cCESifo, Munich, Germany
ABSTRACT
Using a fixed effects panel model on data for 110 countries over the period 2000–2011, we confirm
previous findings that financial stability transparency increases the degree of financial stability in
a country. However, our results also suggest that financial stability transparency is significantly








Until recently, central bank transparency about
financial stability only received scant attention,
unlike central bank communication about monetary
policy. However, some recent studies provide evi-
dence that communication about financial stability
may enhance financial stability. Born, Ehrmann, and
Fratzscher (2014) report that news reflected in
Financial Stability Reports (FSRs) reduces market
volatility. These effects are particularly strong if
FSRs contain optimistic assessments of the risks to
financial stability. Čihák et al. (2012) report that
high-quality FSRs are associated with higher finan-
cial stability, where quality is determined based on
the clarity, the coverage of the key risk in the finan-
cial system, and the consistency of the FSRs. Finally,
Horváth and Vaško (2016) construct a Financial
Stability Transparency index (FST-index) and show
that this index is positively related to financial stabi-
lity. This index is comprehensive and focuses not
only on the coverage of financial stability reports but
also on other communication channels, decision-
making procedures and underlying legal aspects. In
our view, the FST-index is the best available proxy
for financial stability transparency and we therefore
use it in our analysis.
We examine whether the relationship between
the FST-index and financial stability (proxied by
the non-performing loans ratio) is conditioned by
institutional quality. Although institutional quality
may have a direct impact on financial stability as
reported by Das, Quintyn, and Chenard (2004),
some recent papers report that the effectiveness of
policies aimed at maintaining financial stability is
mediated by some proxy for institutional quality
(cf. Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Mare 2018).
This paper examines whether the relationship
between the FST-index provided by Horváth and
Vaško (2016) is conditioned by two widely used
proxies for institutional quality, namely the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) provided by
Transparency International and the Government
Effectiveness (GE) index provided by theWorld Bank.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 explains the methodology and describes
the data used. Section 3 presents the empirical
results and section 4 concludes.
II. Method and data
In line with several previous studies (including
Horváth and Vaško 2016), the log of the ratio of
banks’ non-performing loans to total gross loans is
used as dependent variable. Data for the non-
performing loans ratio comes from the Global
Financial Development database of the World
Bank. Figure 1 shows that the average non-
performing loans ratio decreased in the run-up to
the Global Financial Crisis and sharply increased
thereafter. The trend for countries with low and
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high values of the FST-index seems identical, but
the level of the non-performing loans ratio differs
across these subgroups. Figure 1 also shows the
FST index from Horváth and Vaško (2016). The
relatively low average of the FST-index reflects that
our sample includes many non-OECD countries.
The figure also shows that countries which have
lower levels of corruption, i.e. a higher institutional
quality, are more transparent.
The following model is estimated:
Finstabilityit ¼ αit þ β1FSTindexit þ β2IQit
þ β3FSTindexit  IQit þ Cit þ Bit
þ εit
(1)
where Finstabilityit represents Horváth and Vaško
(2016) indicator of financial stability transparency
for country i in year t. β1 captures the relationship
between financial stability transparency and finan-
cial stability and β2 shows the direct impact of the
quality of institutions on financial stability, while β3
shows the combined impact of financial stability
transparency and institutional quality. Cit is a set of
country-specific control variables. Following
Horváth and Vaško (2016), we include the follow-
ing country-specific controls in the model: gross
domestic product per capita (GDPPC), the growth
rate of GDP (GDPG), inflation measured in per-
centage change of the consumer price index
(INFL), the real interest rate change in percentage
(REALINT), domestic credit to GDP in percentage
(CREDIT), the change of the nominal exchange
rate against the U.S. Dollar in percentage (EXCH),
stock market capitalization to GDP in percentage
(MARKCAP) and financial openness (the sum of
foreign assets and liabilities divided by GDP;
FINOPEN). Furthermore, Bit is a set of bank-
specific controls as proposed by Fazio et al.
(2018), namely the ratio of non-interest income to
total income in percentage (NONINT) as a proxy
for non-traditional activities of banks, banks’ over-
head costs to assets ratio (COST) and banking
concentration (measured as the total assets of the
three largest banks in percentage; CONCEN).
Finally, εit represents the error term.
Our measures for institutional quality have been
obtained from Transparency International and the
World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, respec-
tively. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) index
ranks countries by their perceived levels of corruption
(on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 is very clean). The
government effectiveness (GE) index captures percep-
tions of the quality of public services, i.e. the quality of
the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formula-
tion and implementation, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to such policies. Data for
most country-specific control variables have been
obtained from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators and Global Financial
Development databases.1 Both proxies have been
widely used in the literature as indicators of institu-
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Figure 1. Average non-performing loans ratio and FST-index, 2000–2011.
The left-hand side figure shows the FST-index for all countries in the sample and for countries with below/above median scores for the perceived corruption
index. The right-hand side figure shows the average NPL ratio for all countries in the sample and for countries with below/above median scores for the FST-
index.
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Finally, the non-interest to income ratio
(NONINT), bank overhead costs to total cost ratio
(COST), and the banking concentration measure
(CONCEN) come from the Global Financial
Development database.
Table 1 shows summary statistics.
III. Estimation results
Table 2 shows our estimation results for the model
shown in equation (1). Several conclusions can be
drawn. First, in line with the results of Horváth and
Vaško (2016), our results show that financial stabi-
lity transparency enhances financial stability as the
coefficient on the FST-index is negative and sig-
nificantly different from zero, except for the esti-
mations shown in column (3). Second, also
institutional quality seems to enhance financial sta-
bility. A higher score for the CPI index indicates
less corruption and its coefficient is negative and
significant. This finding is consistent with the
results of Das, Quintyn, and Chenard (2004).
However, the coefficient on our second proxy for
institutional quality, i.e. government effectiveness,
is estimated rather imprecisely.
As shown by Brambor, Clark, and Golder
(2006), the conditional effect of the FSR-index
on the NPL-ratio should not be assessed on the
basis of the significance (or lack thereof) of the
coefficient on the interaction term. Figure 2(a)
therefore presents the marginal effect of finan-
cial stability transparency on our indicator of
financial stability for different values of the CP-
index, based on the estimates as shown in col-
umn (2) of Table 2. There is a statistically sig-
nificant effect of the FST-index on financial
stability when the upper and lower bounds of
the confidence intervals are both below or above
zero. Figure 2(a) shows a negative marginal
effect of the FST-index, which is statistically
significant between the range of 0.0 to 5.0 for
the CP-index. In contrast, for high values of the
CP-index, the marginal effect of the FST-index
is statistically insignificant.
Figure 2(a) shows the marginal effect of finan-
cial stability transparency on our indicator of
financial stability for different values of the GE-
index based on the estimates as shown in col-
umn (4) of Table 2. The results are quite similar
to the results of the marginal effects when the
CP-index is used as a measure of the quality of
institutions. The marginal effect of the FST-
index is negative and significant only for low
levels of the GE-index.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables (515 observations).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Stand. dev. Minimum Maximum
NPL −3.165 1.075 −6.907 −0.519
FST-index 2.967 2.711 0.000 9.000
CPI-index 5.046 2.370 0.400 9.900
GE-index (497 obs) 0.572 0.885 −1.215 2.437
GDPPC 18,410.300 18,715.280 419.336 72,823.800
MARKCAP 64.057 61.870 0.010 464.721
CREDIT 70.093 49.667 0.186 312.019
REALINT 5.483 8.265 −20.129 48.341
INFL 4.665 4.305 −4.863 28.203
GDPG 4.280 3.762 −14.759 19.592
FINOPEN 3.596 6.785 0.414 75.757
EXCH −0.502 8.466 −16.613 37.301
NONINT 36.416 12.219 7.977 77.234
COST 3.173 2.200 0.051 12.737
CONCEN 65.185 18.381 23.324 100.000
The dependent variable used is the natural logarithm of the transformed
non-performing loans ratio (NPL). The FST-index is the Financial Stability
Index of Horváth and Vaško (2016). The institutional quality measures are
the CPI-index (corruption) and the GE-index (government effectiveness) as
explained in the main text. Country-specific controls include GDP per
capita (GDPPC), annual GDP growth (GDPG), yearly inflation in % (INFL),
the real interest rate (REALINT), domestic credit provided to financial
sector (CREDIT), the nominal exchange rate change (EXCH), the stock
market capitalization (MARKCAP), and financial openness (FINOPEN). The
bank-specific controls consist of non-interest income (NONINT), the over-
head costs to total assets (COST), and banking concentration (CONCEN).
Table 2. The conditional effect of institutional quality on finan-
cial stability.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables NPL NPL NPL NPL
FST-index −0.044* −0.170** −0.037 −0.0742**









Country-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 515 515 497 497
Number of countries 66 66 67 67
R-squared 0.376 0.361 0.350 0.350
This table presents fixed-effects regressions of Eq. 1. Robust standard errors
clustered by country are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
and * p < 0.1.
1The nominal exchange rate change has been drawn from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, the measure for financial openness comes from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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IV. Conclusions
Our results suggest that the effect of financial sta-
bility transparency on financial stability is condi-
tioned by institutional quality: only with low
institutional quality (high level of corruption or
low government efficiency) is financial stability
transparency significantly negatively related to
banks’ non-performing loans.
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Figure 2.Marginal effect of the FST-index on NPL conditional on
institutional quality.
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